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Abstract
People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some
individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginal-
ized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and
gain social status in the process. Analyzing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys
conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we identify the
prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we
explore whether di erent subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence
that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society,
while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a
unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individ-
uals to “want to watch the world burn.”
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—“Some men just want to watch the world burn,” The Dark Knight
Political observers and scholars are sounding alarms over increasing polarization between polit-
ical parties (Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2018), the emergence of populist movements and leaders
(Norris and Inglehart, 2019), the circulation of misinformation (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018),
hostile interactions on social media (Tucker et al., 2017) and rising levels of actual political vio-
lence (Turchin, 2016). While traditional forms of political activism in Western democracies focus
on winning power and support through conventional means provided by the political system, these
emerging forms of activism seek to disrupt the existing system altogether (Petersen, Osmundsen
and Arceneaux, 2020). As Alfred the Butler, a character in The Dark Knight, explains in the quote
above, some people want to tear down existing social and political institutions than build them.
Prior research links current-day disruptive activism to experiences of social marginalization
(Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020) and rising economic inequality (Turchin, 2016). At
the same time, however, not everyone who feels marginalized has a desire to “watch the world burn.”
In fact, an emerging line of research suggests that these highly disruptive sentiments, referred to as
a Need for Chaos, are contingent on a particular set of psychological dispositions: An intense desire
for social status (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020; Petersen, Osmundsen and Bor, 2020;
Bartusevi ius, van Leeuwen and Petersen, 2020). Individuals vary in the degree to which they crave
status and, when excluded, individuals who possess an intense desire for status are more likely to
view disruption and chaos as a viable strategy for obtaining the status that they crave. Accordingly,
status-obsessed yet marginalized individuals may find it more attractive to disrupt the entire social
hierarchy altogether rather than to engage in a slow, seemingly futile climb up the social ladder.
Need for Chaos is defined as “a desire for a new beginning through the destruction of order
and established structures” (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020). To measure individual
di erences in such desires, Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux developed and validated a battery
of eight items that reflects individual di erences in desires for a new beginning, the destruction
of established structures, and upsetting the established order (e.g., degree of agreement with items
such as “I think society should be burned to the ground” and “Sometimes I just feel like destroying
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beautiful things”). This Need for Chaos scale (henceforth, NFCChaos scale) is highly predictive of
a heightened orientation towards disruptive behaviors, such as political violence and the sharing of
hostile political content (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020; Lawson and Kakkar, 2020).
Psychologically, the Need for Chaos is best conceptualized as a characteristic adaptation — i.e.,
a latent attitude that is made manifest in the interplay between particular personality traits and par-
ticular social contexts (McAdams and Pals, 2006). Consistent with this view, prior research shows
that the Need for Chaos is highly correlated with, but distinct from, status-oriented personality traits
such as the Dark Triad of Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism (Petersen, Osmundsen
and Arceneaux, 2020). Furthermore, and again consistent with the characteristic adaptation per-
spective, research shows that such personality traits are particularly predictive of a Need for Chaos
in contexts involving deprivation and exclusion (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020). In
contrast, status-oriented individuals have consistently been found to engage in so-called “system-
justification” when deprivation is absent; in this content, systemic injustices are explained away as
a reflection of individual choice (Jost, Banaji and Nosek, 2004). Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical
model: Need for Chaos is activated by the confluence of status-oriented personality traits and the
presence of perceived marginalization. In this regard, it is also important to note that while chaos-
oriented motivations are triggered by thwarted status aspirations, chaos-seekers do not need to be
deprived in an absolute sense. In fact, previous research suggests that a Need for Chaos is more
widespread in middle rather than low income groups (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020).
While existing work has identified chaos-seeking as a measurable social strategy and demon-
strates how it leads to disruptive behavior political behavior, we know much less about who chaos-
seekers are. The aim of the present manuscript thus provides the first comprehensive, cross-national
assessment of the profile of a core challenge facing Western democracies: That a number of indi-
viduals are so fed up with the current system that they would rather see it burned to the ground than
reformed. In doing so, it seeks to answer three descriptive questions.
First, what is the prevalence of the Need for Chaos? What proportion of the public in modern
democracies support “burning it all down?” The media and scholarly attention to disruptive behav-
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model for Causes and Consequences of Need for Chaos
iors, such as sharing “fake news,” may suggest that a craving for chaos is exceptionally widespread.
Indeed, prior research argues that individuals who are high in Need for Chaos may comprise a sig-
nificant minority of the American population (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020). Yet,
at present, this question has only been assessed in the United States, which is notable for its high
level of polarization and inequality relative to other industrialized countries. Here, we provide com-
parative evidence by relying on representative surveys in four English-speaking democracies that
vary significantly in their levels of polarization and inequality: Australia, Canada, the United King-
dom, and the United States. We also contribute in terms of measurement. While previous research
has demonstrated that the Need for Chaos is a measurable, uni-dimensional concept (Petersen, Os-
mundsen and Arceneaux, 2020), its nature as a characteristic adaptation suggests that there are
many potential pathways that may trigger this need. To examine this, we add to existing research by
exploring whether there are di erent subtypes within the overarching category of chaos-seekers.
Second, it is unclear how (un)representative individuals high in Need for Chaos are in terms of
demographics and personality. Are all groups equally likely to hold a segment of radicals, or are
particular groups more likely than others to contain those with such attitudes? While some evidence
exists that the Need for Chaos is distinct from other malevolent traits (Petersen, Osmundsen and
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Arceneaux, 2020), it is crucial to replicate this finding in countries outside of the United States.
Finally, we know little about the political aims and behaviors of chaos-seekers beyond their
orientation to disruption. Are they a uniform political group in the sense that they share a set of
ideological positions and issues attitudes? Or, in contrast, does ‘chaos seeking’ constitute a thin
ideology (Mudde, 2004) that weakly links a politically diverse and uncoordinated set of individuals
who want to watch the world burn for very di erent reasons? Prior exploratory analyses suggest
that individuals high in Need for Chaos can be found at the extremes of both the political right
and left, but a broad assessment of their political inclinations on standard inventories of political
behaviors and attitudes has not yet been done.
Exploring the Presence of Subtypes Underlying the NFCChaos Scale
We placed the NFCChaos scale on nationally representative surveys of British, American, Canadian,
and Australian publics’ political and social attitudes. The scale was placed on the December 2018
waves of a large multiwave panel study conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US), fielded by YouGov with sample sizes of 5,105 and 5,000, respectively. The Australian
and Canadian studies were fielded by Research Now-Survey Sampling International (now Dynata)
in January 2019 with sample sizes of 1,045 and 1,100, respectively. Poststratification weights bring
all samples into line with population demographics. Our first step was to replicate Petersen, Os-
mundsen and Arceneaux (2020). We found that 1) NFC forms a uni-dimension scale that is 2)
positively correlated with negative personality traits (the Dark Triad and Narcissism) but 3) distinct
from them (See Sections 1 and 2 of the Appendix for details). Therefore, we provide additional ev-
idence that the NFCChaos scale is a valid scale in the US as well as in other Anglo-Saxon contexts.
Having confirmed that the NFCChaos scale measures a continuous uni-dimensional trait, we now
turn toward exploring whether there are subtypes of individuals who are driven by di erent mo-
tivations. The challenge in doing this kind of descriptive analysis is that we need to place people
into distinct categories (e.g., “chaos seeker”) based on a measure that is both theoretically and em-
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pirically continuous. In order to avoid the pitfalls that would be inherent in using arbitrary cuto s
(e.g., above/below the scale median), we address this issue using Latent Profile Analysis. Although
NFCChaos forms a single factor, Latent Profile Analysis can take a concept defined by a single di-
mension and delineate groups of cases that constitute subtypes of the overall concept (McCutcheon,
1987). As Bernstein and Zvolensky (2011, 99) note, “a key distinction between factor analytic in
comparison to. . . latent class/profile analytic strategies is that the former is concerned with the struc-
ture of the variables (i.e. their correlations), whereas the latter is concerned with the structure of
cases (i.e., the latent taxonomic structure).”
We performed exploratory latent profile mixture modelling in Mplus, constraining the means
of the indicators (now considered interval level) to be equivalent across the four nations.1 To de-
termine the appropriate number of profiles, we employ both empirical fit statistics and look for
points of substantive interpretation. From fit statistics and subsequent modeling, it is clear that
there are more profiles underlying these data than a simple two profile, “high/low” NFCChaos. Our
analysis suggests that classifying respondents into one of four profiles is empirically supported and
substantively meaningful.2
Results from the four profile model appear in Table 1, which reports the mean level on each
indicator by profile (all four countries combined) and Table 2, which reports the size of the latent
profiles for each of the four countries we examine. There is a clear pattern to each of the profiles.
The first one, which we label “Low Chaos” (LC), is a profile of individuals who have, on average
scores close to the minimum of the seven point scale on all of the indicators. The second is a set
of respondents who have average scores only slightly higher than those in the LC profile on items
1,6, and 7, but higher scores on the middle four items. We label this group the “Rebuilders” (RB),
because they tend to score low on items that measure a desire for destruction without a purpose,
while scoring higher on items that indicate a desire to tear down existing structures in the hope
1The interval scales run from 1-7, where 1 is “Strongly Disagree” and 7 is “Strongly Agree.”
2We note that the quality of classification statistic —“entropy” or the probability a respondent is classified in one
group over another — is 98.5%. Estimating additional classes yields slightly lower entropy, and the size of the additional
profiles is small and substantively uninteresting. Equality constraints on the indicator means are used to permit valid
and meaningful cross-national comparisons of the sizes of each of the profile.
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Table 1: Multigroup Latent Profile Analysis: Need for Chaos Indicators
Low Medium High
Indicator Chaos Rebuild Chaos Chaos
1. I get a kick when natural disasters strike in foreign countries. 1.15 2.06 3.54 6.05
2. I fantasize about a natural disaster wiping out most of humanity such
that a small group of people can start all over.
1.30 3.48 3.70 6.09
3. I think society should be burned to the ground. 1.20 3.90 3.69 6.11
4. When I think about our political and social institutions, I cannot help
thinking ”just let them all burn.”
1.80 4.40 3.90 5.90
5. We cannot fix the problems in our social institutions, we need to tear
them down and start over.
2.26 4.34 3.92 5.69
6. I need chaos around me – it is too boring if nothing is going on. 1.43 2.49 3.69 5.99
7. Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things. 1.07 1.29 4.14 6.57
Notes: N = 12,250 (USA N=5000; UK N=5105; Canada N=1045; Australia N=1100; Likelihood: -146298.27; AIC: 292696.53; BIC: 293067.20;
Sample Size Adjusted BIC: 292908.30. Paired t-tests comparing means of the Low Chaos indicators to means obtained for the other classes are all
significant at p<0.05. Indicator means are constrained to be equal across the nations (“groups”).
of building something better. We labelled a third group of respondents as “Medium Chaos” (MC),
because their scores on each item tend to be near the midpoint of the scale.3 (For the three items that
explicitly mention political or social institutions, “Rebuilders” express higher mean scores than the
those in the “Medium Chaos” group. Finally, we identified a “High Chaos” (HC) profile, in which
respondents scores were, on average, approximately 6 out of 7 on each of the items. Note that
in contrast to the RB class, the items with the highest means in this profile are those that favor
destruction for the sake of destruction.
Turning to Table 2 to get a sense of the size of the profiles, the majority of respondents in each
nation are most likely to fall into the LC profile. Approximately 1 in 5 respondents are part of
a profile were the average response is near the scale midpoint for each item. Approximately 1 in
10 respondents in each nation, ranging from a high of 13% in the UK to a low of 8% in Canada
most likely fit the RB profile. Lastly, there is a small but significant group of respondents who,
on average, tend to strongly agree with each of the items of the NFCChaos scale and fall into the
HC profile. This ranges from a low of 3% of the UK sample to a high of 10% in the Canadian
sample. Combining the RB and HC profiles for each nation, suggests that between 15% and 19%
3Auxiliary analyses suggest this profile contains respondents who tend to answer at the midpoints of other scales,
and in the US and UK, answer a rmatively to questions as to whether they are prone not to take surveys seriously. In
the remaining portion of this paper, we set this profile mostly aside in our analyses and interpretations.
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Table 2: Profile Membership Across Nations: Need for Chaos
Profile USA UK Canada Australia
Low Chaos 69% 70% 66% 60%
Rebuilders 10% 13% 8% 11%
Medium Chaos 17% 15% 16% 21%
High Chaos 5% 3% 10% 8%
Notes: Percentages based on profile membership derived from the estimated model in Mplus v 8.4
crave chaos to some degree.
Who is High in Need for Chaos?
In this section, we turn our attention to exploring the correlates of our NFCChaos latent class pro-
files. Is it the case that individuals who fall in the HC profile are di erent from those who fall in
the RB profile? If so, it may indicate that these individuals’ craving for chaos has roots in di erent
motivations. We explore this question by investigating whether demographic characteristics and
political ideology contribute to variance in the NFCChaos latent profiles. Our analytical approach
involves using multinomial logit to regress the latent profile categories on measures of demographic
characteristics and political ideology, while controlling for Big 5 personality traits and racial cate-
gories relevant to each country. It is important to control for Big 5 personality traits because Need
for Chaos may reflect an “undercontrolled personality prototype” — a pattern where someone is
low in agreeableness and conscientiousness and high in neuroticism (Asendorpf et al., 2001). The
data, shown in Section 3 of the Appendix, o er some support for this possibility.4
We focus on demographic characteristics (gender, age, and education) that previous research
has found to be linked to perceived marginalization and the motivation to acquire status, both of
which are associated with the Need for Chaos. With respect to gender and age, psychological studies
often conceptualize status-seeking as part of a “young male syndrome” (Wilson and Daly, 1985).
Education may also be important because it has become a major fault line in Western democracies,
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility to us. We ran separate models for each country.
See Section 3 of the Appendix for the full regression results.
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as those without a college degree often feel left out and pushed aside in post-industrial knowledge
economies (Iversen and Soskice, 2019; Turchin, 2016).
The results of the multinomial logit analysis show a clear pattern across all four countries: Men
and young people are more likely to be classified as RB or HC (see Appendix for results). Yet as
Table 3 shows, the relationship between age and Need for Chaos appears conditional on education.
This table shows the predicted probabilities generated from the multinomial logit models where
we interacted education with indicators for generation cohorts (Silent, Boomer, Generation X, and
Millennial). We focus on generation cohorts, because “trends in political alienation reflect political
and historical events or periods which a ect all members of the population in a similar fashion”
(Cutler and Bengtson, 1974, 160). For the most part, individuals with higher levels of education
are more likely to fall in the LC category than individuals with lower levels of education, across
generational cohorts. There are some exceptions to this pattern, particularly in Australia where
education does not seem to discriminate the LC category very much. In contrast, relative to more
educated individuals, less educated individuals seem to be more drawn to the RB category and, to
a lesser extent, the HC category. Australia o ers yet another exception to this pattern, with more
educated individuals gravitating to the HC category at a higher rate than those with less education.
Turning our attention to generational di erences, we do not observe large or consistent di erences
across cohorts with respect to RB or HC.
Next, we explore whether ideology influences whether people gravitate toward HC. Across all
nations, respondents were asked to place themselves on an eleven point ideology scale, which we
recode to five categories ranging from “Far Left” to “Far Right.” Table 4 shows the predicted prob-
abilities generated from the same multinomial logit models that generated Table 3 (we set the other
variables in the model such that this are specifically the probabilities for a male without a college
degree, who falls in the Boomer generation, and scores average scores on the Big Five personality
traits). Across all four countries, individuals categorized as HC are also more likely to consider
themselves to be on the political right. This suggests that there is indeed an overlap between right-
wing populism and Need for Chaos. Alternatively, some of the dynamics occasionally attributed to
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Table 3: Need for Chaos Profile Membership by Generation and Graduate Status
Lower Education
Country Generation Low Chaos Rebuild Medium Chaos High Chaos
United States Silent 79% 15% 3% 4%
Boomer 77% 13% 9% 1%
X 59% 20% 18% 3%
Millennial 53% 21% 25% 1%
United Kingdom Silent 68% 19% 8% 5%
Boomer 72% 14% 11% 4%
X 66% 15% 16% 3%
Millennial 44% 17% 35% 3%
Canada Silent 78% 8% 10% 4%
Boomer 78% 8% 7% 7%
X 57% 23% 12% 8%
Millennial 49% 21% 18% 12%
Australia Silent 53% 45% 2% 0%
Boomer 53% 35% 8% 3%
X 50% 24% 18% 7%
Millennial 43% 26% 24% 7%
Higher Education
United States Silent 88% 8% 4% 0%
Boomer 86% 8% 1% 5%
X 79% 10% 8% 3%
Millennial 87% 6% 3% 4%
United Kingdom Silent 76% 19% 4% 2%
Boomer 76% 10% 11% 3%
X 71% 18% 9% 2%
Millennial 71% 14% 11% 5%
Canada Silent 91% 6% 0% 3%
Boomer 74% 12% 3% 11%
X 56% 16% 17% 12%
Millennial 63% 8% 13% 16%
Australia Silent 50% 32% 4% 12%
Boomer 70% 20% 5% 6%
X 51% 13% 32% 4%
Millennial 40% 11% 35% 14%
Notes: Scenario–Male, No Higher Education, and average on personality traits.
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Table 4: High Chaos Profile Membership by Ideology Across Nations
Ideology USA UK Canada Australia
Very Left 3% 2% 7% 0%
Left 2% 4% 10% 1%
Moderate 1% 4% 7% 3%
Right 2% 4% 7% 6%
Very Right 6% 9% 12% 7%
Notes: Scenario–Male, No Higher Education, Avg Personality, Boomer
right-wing populism (e.g., circulation of misinformation and preferences for strong leaders) may, in
fact, reflect desires for chaos among some on the right-wing rather than populist values (Petersen,
Osmundsen and Bor, 2020). We return to this below.
What Do People High in Need for Chaos Want?
The previous analysis suggests that education explains some of the variation between LC individ-
uals and the rest and that right-wing ideology explains some of the variance in HC categorization.
Nonetheless, we do not find a clear pattern that distinguishes HC and RB with respect to demo-
graphics, which raises this question about whether these categories map onto di erence in political
preferences and behavior. We now turn to this question.
These analyses focus on the US and UK in this section, because the Australian and Canadian
surveys contained a more limited (and non-comparable) set of variables. Beginning with political
preferences, Table 5 shows regression coe cients for each of the latent profile categories (with LC
being the excluded category). The items in the rows are the dependent variables that measure pol-
icy preferences for each of the regression models. The dependent variables were measured using
five-point Likert agree/disagree scales. The regression models include controls for demographic
characteristics (age, gender, race, education, and interaction between education and age), personal-
ity traits, and political ideology.
We do not observe a consistent pattern in political preferences across the latent profile cate-
gories in the US and UK. In both countries, individuals in the LC category are less likely to agree
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Table 5: The Association between Need for Chaos Latent Profile Categories and Policy Preferences
(a) US: Regression coe cients for chaos profiles for attitudinal outcomes (low chaos excluded category)
Policy Position Rebuild Profile Medium Chaos High Chaos
Islam is a serious danger to Western civilization. 0.25⇤⇤ 0.02 0.14
(0.09) (0.11) (0.15)
All further immigration to the US should be halted. 0.40⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16)
The death penalty, even for very serious crimes, is never justified. -0.03 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16)
People are better o  in a free market economy.  0.23⇤⇤⇤  0.46⇤⇤⇤ 0.15
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
The welfare state makes people less able to look after themselves. 0.11 -0.11 0.16
(0.09) (0.10) (0.14)
Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society. 0.28⇤⇤⇤ -0.01 0.21
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14)
(b) UK: Regression coe cients for chaos profiles for attitudinal outcomes (low chaos excluded category)
Policy Position Rebuild Profile Medium Chaos High Chaos
Islam is a serious danger to Western civilization. 0.40⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.73⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.10) (0.16)
All further immigration to the UK should be halted. 0.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤⇤ 0.56⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.10) (0.16)
The death penalty, even for very serious crimes, is never justified.  0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.06 0.21
(0.09) (0.11) (0.17)
People are better o  in a free market economy. -0.10 -0.12 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
The welfare state makes people less able to look after themselves. 0.06 0.22⇤ 0.33⇤
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society. 0.21⇤⇤ -0.04 0.47
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
Notes: Each row represents a separate regression model. The models include a full slate of appropriate control variables, with full results available
in the appendix. In these two panels, we report the un-standardized coe cients for the “Rebuilders”, “Medium Chaos”, and “High chaos” groups
versus the excluded category of those in the “Low Chaos” profile. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤ p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.005
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that immigration should be halted relative to the other categories. There are also no major di er-
ences between RB and HC categories with respect to immigration — individuals in both of these
categories would prefer that immigration be stopped. In both countries, it also appears that those
who fall in the RB category are more bothered by “new lifestyles” than are individuals in the HC
category. In the US, individuals in the RB category are also more likely to question capitalism,
while those in the UK are more supportive of the death penalty. Our interpretation of these findings
is that those who fall in the RB category exhibit enough idealism or principles that is distinct from
the full embrace of nihilism apparent in the “High Chaos” profile.
Next, we consider the relationship between NFCChaos latent profile categories and political par-
ticipation. Table 6 shows regression coe cients for each of the latent profile categories (with LC
being the excluded category). The items in the rows are the dependent variables that measure po-
litical participation for each of the regression models. The dependent variables reflect survey items
that asked respondents on a 0-10 scale how likely they are to take part in a variety of political activi-
ties in the “next few years.” The regression models include controls for demographic characteristics
(age, gender, race, education, and interaction between education and age), personality traits, and
political ideology. Consistent with Petersen, Osmundsen & Arceneaux (2020), we find that indi-
viduals who fall in the HC category are much more likely to say that they would take part in an
“illegal protest,” even relative to those in the RB category.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to explore whether di erent motivations underlie the characteristic
adaptation Need for Chaos (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2020). We replicated previous
research in four Anglo-Saxon countries. The NFCChaos scale forms a uni-dimensional scale that
captures a continuous characteristic adaptation in the Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. We
then turned to Latent Profile Analysis to investigate whether di erent subtypes of individuals ex-
plained variance in the NFCChaos scale. We found evidence that this may indeed be the case, with
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Table 6: The Association between Need for Chaos Latent Profile Categories and Political Partici-
pation
(a) US: Regression coe cients for chaos profiles for forms of participation (low chaos excluded category)
Participation Item Rebuild Profile Medium Chaos High Chaos
Wear or display a campaign badge or sticker -0.03 0.59 1.42
(0.32) (0.36) (0.50)
Vote in a presidential election  0.78⇤⇤  1.39⇤⇤⇤ -0.35
(0.20) (0.22) (0.30)
Work for a political party, candidate, or action group -0.38 0.68⇤ 1.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.34) (0.44)
Take part in a lawful protest or public demonstration 0.08 1.20⇤⇤⇤ 1.55⇤⇤
(0.29) (0.33) (0.47)
Take part in an illegal protest 0.46⇤ 1.72⇤⇤⇤ 2.79⇤⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.22) (0.32)
Vote in a local election -0.50⇤  1.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.04
(0.20) (0.23) (0.33)
Give money to a political party or candidate -0.50 0.41 0.89
(0.32) (0.36) (0.50)
Post about politics on Facebook, Twitter, or other social media -0.03 -0.08 0.63
(0.35) (0.39) (0.57)
Comment on political posts of family on social media 0.24 1.00⇤ 0.95
(0.34) (0.39) (0.53)
(b) UK: Regression coe cients for chaos profiles for forms of participation (low chaos excluded category
Participation Item Rebuild Profile Medium Chaos High Chaos
Wear or display a campaign badge or sticker 0.38 0.41 -0.12
(0.23) (0.24) (0.42)
Vote in a parliamentary election.  1.80⇤⇤⇤  1.95⇤⇤⇤  1.80⇤⇤⇤
(0.22) (0.23) (0.37)
Work for a political party, candidate, or action group 0.07 0.80⇤⇤⇤ 0.26
(0.18) (0.21) (0.33)
Take part in a lawful protest or public demonstration 0.11 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.26
(0.22) (0.26) (0.39)
Take part in an illegal protest. 0.41⇤ 0.93⇤⇤⇤ 0.92⇤⇤⇤
(0.16) (0.18) (0.30)
Vote in a local election  1.37⇤⇤⇤  1.60⇤⇤⇤  2.00⇤⇤⇤
(0.22) (0.25) (0.42)
Give money to a political party or candidate -0.28 0.65⇤⇤ 0.24
(0.18) (0.20) (0.36)
Post about politics on Facebook, Twitter, or other social media 0.37 0.60⇤ 0.25
(0.74) (0.26) (0.46)
Comment on political posts of family on social media 0.23 0.39 1.04⇤
(0.24) (0.28) (0.46)
Notes: Each row represents a separate regression model. The models include a full slate of appropriate control variables, with full results available
in the appendix. In these two panels, we report the un-standardized coe cients for the “Rebuilders”, “Medium Chaos”, and “High chaos” groups
versus the excluded category of those in the “Low Chaos” profile. ⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤ p < 0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.005
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individuals falling into four di erent latent categories: Low Chaos, Medium Chaos, Rebuild, and
High Chaos. The key di erence between those in the Rebuild and High Chaos categories is that
Rebuilders were less likely to agree with statements supporting destruction for the sake of destruc-
tion relative to those who were in the High Chaos category (e.g., “I get a kick when natural disasters
strike in foreign countries”).
Across all four countries, most people fell in the Low Chaos category and few people fell in the
High Chaos category, but combining the Rebuild and High Chaos categories showed that there is
support for some degree of chaos-seeking at around 20 percent among Anglo-Saxon countries. Is
this something that should be worrying from a normative standpoint? We believe that the Latent
Profile Analysis helps answer this question. If 20 percent of a country yearned for a violent over-
throw of the current system, it would be worrying, but it seems that a considerable fraction of this
20 percent does not want destruction for the sake of destruction, but rather they imagine rebuilding
society’s institutions in a way that does not involve violence. We leave aside whether their partic-
ular vision is a “good” one, and simply note that most Utopian visions begin with the notion that
society must be remade in some fundamental way.
We then turned our attention to exploring whether demographic and political characteristics
help di erentiate who falls in the di erent latent profile categories. Echoing previous research,
we found evidence that chaos-seeking tends to be higher among the young, men, and those with
less than a college degree. Interestingly, we did not find consistent di erences in terms of demo-
graphics between the Rebuilder and High Chaos subtypes. This would suggest that chaos-seekers,
whether they like destruction for the sake of destruction or not, may be motivated by a sense of
marginalization and grievance that exists at high levels in Western society today (Turchin, 2016).
We also found that individuals who identify as right wing were also more likely to fall in the High
Chaos category, yet when we turned our attention to the political preferences of these individuals,
the only consistent pattern that emerged was a dislike of immigration. Consistent with Petersen,
Osmundsen and Arceneaux (2020), we do not find much evidence that individuals in the High Chaos
category are idealistic visionaries who want to dismantle social and political institutions to build
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a better world. Our evidence was much more consistent with the results of previous research that
paint individuals high on the NFCChaos scale as nihilists who are only looking out for themselves.
In contrast, individuals who fell in the Rebuild category did seem to have something approaching
a social outlook. They do not like new lifestyles and, in the US, they are not fans of capitalism.
Perhaps these individuals want to replace established political institutions to make the world a better
place (at least their view of what constitutes “better.”).
The empirical result of two substantive “chaos-seeking” profiles warrants further comment and
speculation given the current political environment and the challenges that populists politicians
and causes (such as, Donald Trump and Brexit) pose to the established order. Populists potentially
knock on an “open door” because western political systems under supply political parties with so-
cially conservative and economically left-leaning manifestos (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009;
J. Scotto, Sanders and Reifler, 2018). A close look at Tables 5 suggests that the picture of the
RB and the HC members have some characteristics of politically alienated social conservatives,
with the larger Rebuilder profile displaying more of these characteristics — e.g., opposition to free
market capitalism and immigration or “new lifestyles.” The “supply” of candidates and opportuni-
ties matter; results from Table 6 suggest that Rebuilders and (in the UK) High Chaos respondents
have little interest in traditional political activity. Will Brexit as a “rebuilding” opportunity change
the propensity of Rebuilders to eschew the act of voting and di erentiate the two profiles further?
These are areas ripe for additional research given the empirical establishment and cross-national
validation of the two chaos profiles presented in this paper.
Summing up, it is important to recognize that the quest for status and recognition is deeply
ingrained in human nature (Kenrick et al., 2010). The finding that thwarted status-desires drive a
Need for Chaos, which then activates support for political protest and violence, suggest that a Need
for Chaos may be a key driver of societal change, both presently and historically. In this regard, the
present analyses emphasize that some simply “watch the world burn”, others want to the see a new
world rebuilt from the ashes. Thus, we observe both nihilists (captured by the High Chaos group)
and those who who have a purpose (captured by the Rebuilders group). Nonetheless, due to the
15
destructive force of a high Need for Chaos, one of the key challenges of contemporary societies is
indeed to meet, recognize and, to the extent possible, alleviate the frustrations of these people. The
alternative is a trail of nihilistic destruction.
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